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ABSTRACT. This essay seeks to give a contractarian
foundation to the concept of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), meant as an extended model of
corporate governance of the firm. It focuses on justi-
fication according to the contractarian point of view
(leaving compliance and implementation problems to a
related article, [Sacconi 2004b, forthcoming in the
Journal of Business Ethics]). It begins by providing a
definition of CSR as an extended model of corporate
governance, based on the fiduciary duties owed to all
the firm’s stakeholders. Then, by establishing the basic
context of incompleteness of contracts and abuse of
authority, it analyses how the extended view of cor-
porate governance arises directly from criticism of the
contemporary neo-institutional economic theory of the
firm. Thereafter, an application of the theory of bar-
gaining games is used to deduce the structure of a
multi-stakeholder firm, on the basis of the idea of a
constitutional contract, which satisfies basic require-
ments of impartial justification and accordance with
intuitions of social justice. This is a sequential model of
constitutional bargaining, whereby a constitution is first
chosen, and then a post-constitutional coalition game is
played. On the basis of the unique solution given to
each step in the bargaining model, the quest for a
prescriptive theory of governance and strategic man-
agement is accomplished, so that I am able to define an
objective-function for the firm consistent with the idea
of CSR. Finally, a contractarian potential explanation
for the emergence of the multi-fiduciary firm is
provided.
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Introduction and motivations
This essay seeks to give a contractarian foundation to
the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR), by which is meant an extended model of
corporate governance. In order to account for this
institutional model, the idea of rational agreement
(i.e. the social contract) must be simultaneously
developed in two directions: on the one hand, it
must work as a justification by giving moral reasons
for accepting the institution from an impartial and
impersonal standpoint; on the other, the same idea
must have direct implications for personal incentives
and motivations to implement the institution in
practice. In fact, in a ‘state of nature’, namely a sit-
uation of pre-institutional strategic interaction, the
institution can be implemented only if the agree-
ment is self-enforceable. In other words, the social
contract can resort to no other means of imple-
mentation than those which the agreement is able to
induce by itself. David Gauthier clarified this point
by distinguishing two separate rationality tests that
the ‘morals by agreement’ theory should satisfy
simultaneously (see. Gauthier, 1986, pp. 116–118):
(a) Internal rationality: this is a rationality appraisal
that all individuals conduct when deciding
whether to enter an agreement on rules
which enable them to escape from a recipro-
cally unprofitable ‘natural interaction’ and to
initiate a mode of mutually beneficial coop-
erative interaction. It requires a condition of
ex ante rationality concerning how agreement
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can be reached on one point in the set of
feasible bargaining outcomes. It is ‘internal’
because it views rationality from within the
perspective of bargaining – which takes for
granted that if an agreement is reached, it
will be implemented to the mutual advantage
of the bargainers. Internal rationality (or ex
ante rationality) has one single problem to
solve. Rational bargaining takes place in situ-
ations where there is some feasible surplus to
be distributed amongst the individual partici-
pants, granted that they are able to reach an
agreement. But there are too many agree-
ments possible – some of them preferred by
one party, others by another. Hence, devis-
ing a solution acceptable to all requires solu-
tion of a mixed motives game of
coordination. A bargaining game is a way to
solve this coordination problem before the
bargainers play the cooperative game in
which the agreed joint strategy will be im-
plemented in order to produce and allocate
the surplus. Thus, the ex ante problem of
selecting by bargaining a unique solution can
be detached from the ex post problem of
implementing the contract itself.
(b) External rationality: when we move from the
ex ante to the ex post perspective, we ask
whether any agreement reached can also be
complied with by the same players who
agreed on it. This is a different problem
because the game-logic of compliance differs
from that of entering a bargain in a coopera-
tive game. It is instead the logic of an ex post
non-cooperative game in which the players
decide separately but interdependently
whether or not to comply with the ex ante
agreed contract. From this perspective, the
question is not so much whether the con-
tract provides reasonably high joint benefits
and distributes them in an acceptably fair
way; rather, the question is mainly whether
there are incentives for cheating on the
counterparty to the agreement, given the
expectation that s/he will abide by the con-
tract. Thus, according to Gauthier, the
search for external rationality must address
the problem of a potential divorce between
individual rationality (expected personal
utility maximisation) and social optimality
(i.e. Pareto efficiency), which is instantiated
by the typical prisoner’s dilemma game.
Ken Binmore has made a similar point in his series of
studies on ‘‘game theory and the social contract’’
(Binmore, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2005).1 These
authors – notwithstanding many marked divergences
among them – have carried forward an endeavour to
give a contractarian foundation to institutions in
terms of cooperative bargaining theory on one hand,
and non-cooperative-game theory on the other.
Here, and elsewhere (see Sacconi, 1991 and 2000), I
too have adopted this mode of theorizing. However,
there are aspects besides the mere choice of the
appropriate game model to be discussed in this ac-
count of CSR as a corporate governance model. In
order to outline the set of problems dealt with in this
essay, let me partition them into two broad catego-
ries reflecting the distinction just made. First, I define
the context of justification for a business ethics norm as
the domain in which the condition of validity of a
norm (say, a business ethics code of conduct or a
CSR-code of corporate governance) coincides with
its impartial rational acceptability. It is impartial
acceptability that gives normative force i.e. prescribes
the action or behaviour to be adopted by the agents.
The contractarian approach rests on the hypothesis
that a rational agreement model is the best way to
account for justification. And the one that I use here
will also take a rational agreement to be the outcome
of an appropriately defined bargaining game. Second,
I define the context of compliance and implementation as
the domain where the validity of a business ethics
norm is to be appraised in terms of its effectiveness,
i.e. its ability to induce endogenous motivations or
incentives causing behaviour which complies with
the norm, so that the norm results implemented
through the agents’ behaviour. Setting provisionally
aside the compliance and implementation context, in
so far as it is discussed in a related paper (Sacconi,
2004b), there are four questions to be addressed
within the justification context:
(1) Can we develop a bargaining model whereby
an institutional framework for CSR is deducible as
the solution for the players’ rational calculation of
their best bargaining strategy? This question
concerns the ex ante or ‘internal’ rationality of a
model of governance seen as an outcome of a social
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contract amongst stakeholders: it asks whether the
CSR model of governance could be acceptable for
each and whatever stakeholder once s/he assumes
the role of a rational bargainer in a hypothetical
situation defined as the ‘social contract’ position.
The idea is that if each player recognises that it is
individually rational for him and any other partici-
pant to agree, then we have provided a justification
– at least in the sense of rational mutual advantage.
(2) However, rational mutual advantage as the
basis for accepting a deal from each and whatever
individual player’s standpoint in a bargaining game is
not all that matters in the context of justification.
Acceptability may also require a second kind of test,
one which concerns the moral features (not just the
bargaining-game ones) of the deal the parties would
have struck through hypothetical bargaining. And
these features concern both the notion of impar-
tiality and that of fairness. To control for the former,
one must verify that the bargaining rational solution
is invariant across permutation of the point of views
of all the participants in the hypothetical bargaining
situation. But freedom from any moral arbitrariness,
like the influence of force, fraud and manipulation,
must be verified as well. The bargain must also be
free from lock-in effects, these being the inherent
source of unfairness in the situation usually taken as
the starting point for the contractarian explanation of
why the firm as a ‘transaction governance structure’
emerges. Moreover, we can also check for the fair-
ness of a social contract – even if it has been agreed
in a bargaining situation morally neutralised from
arbitrariness – in terms of its correspondence to our
best moral intuitions about what is a fair or equitable
distribution of cooperative benefits amongst the
firm’s stakeholders.
(3) If distributive justice principles are singled out
through rational bargaining on the governance
structures of the firm, this may also yield definitions
of fiduciary duties which make the ideas of CSR and
the multi-stakeholder firm clearer and more univo-
cal. This can answer the third question to be
addressed, namely the actual prescriptivism of a
stakeholder’s normative theory. Being actually pre-
scriptive requires more than adherence to very loose
ethical standards that most institutional arrangements
of the firm are able to satisfy, leaving the governance
structure and the management strategy underdeter-
mined. It should also prescribe a management
strategy or a stringent set of institutional constraints
whereby a strategy can be singled out.
Indeed, one of the most serious drawbacks to
current social contract theories in business ethics is
that they are unable to provide definite prescrip-
tions for the institutional structure of the firm and
for the business ethics norms that would be ac-
cepted via a social contract among the stakeholders
in the firm. This drawback has prompted some
critics – for example Michael Jensen (2001) – to
condemn the stakeholder approach as unable to
provide a clear benchmark against which manage-
ment strategies and company performances can be
assessed. This prescriptive indeterminacy is also the
basis for the charge that the stakeholder approach
opens the way for opportunistic behaviour by
managers.
The indefiniteness of local social contracts on the
specific business ethics norms regulating specific
business community, groups, firms or organisations
in Donaldson and Dunfee’s (1994, 1995, 1999)
ISCT is a paragon of this weakness.2 Donaldson and
Dunfee see this indefiniteness as a strength of their
approach because of their interpretation of the no-
tions of bounded moral rationality and morally free
zone. Yet we cannot derive from that theory any
contractarian explanation of how local business
norms are shaped by a social contract amongst the
firm’s stakeholders. To allow for such indefiniteness
in local social contracts on the assumption of
‘bounded moral rationality’ is to miss the point. In
fact, general abstract principles of ethics – viewed as
the result of hypothetical social contracts at both the
global and local level (i.e. at the firm level) – should
be seen as alternatives to the standard rationality
model based on utility maximisation. The latter is
based on the implicit assumption that the decision-
maker is able to represent mentally all the logically
possible state of affairs and every possible decision
consequence and calculate the utility maximum over
these possibly infinite spaces of states and conse-
quences. The former is instead based on abstract and
general principles of ethics, which remedy
the inevitable cognitive limitations of the conse-
quentialist model of economic rationality. By typi-
cally fallible but nevertheless reasonable default
reasoning, abstract principles give rise to expecta-
tions about conducts that take place in the presence
of unforeseen states of the world – those states that
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we cannot predict because of our bounded cognitive
capabilities.
(4) Contractarianism is a twofold approach, at the
same time normative and explanatory (according to
the assumption that agent act rationally). Both sides
of the contractarian enterprise foster one another.
Hence the needs of a normative model could be
better answered if the contractarian approach were
able to provide a hypothetical reconstruction of the
emergence of the firm, through an account whereby
the stakeholders agree on a particular constitution for
it, defining the legitimate claims of those in a posi-
tion to run the firm, but also of those subject to their
authority. This account would provide a ‘potential
explanation’ of how the stakeholders have built up
the firm by striking a balance and collectively
deciding the priority order in which different
interests are to be pursued as the corporate goal.
Hence, the final question to be asked is whether the
contractarian account can also give a ‘potential
explanation’ for the emergence of the firm.
This paper proceeds as follows. The second section
furnishes a definition of CSR as an extended model of
corporate governance. The third section discusses
how an extended view of corporate governance arises
from criticism of the contemporary neo-institutional
economic theory of the firm. It sets out the basic
context of the incompleteness of contracts and abuse
of authority that any attempt to justify and implement
the model must consider. The fourth section gives a
detailed description of the structure of a multi-
stakeholder firm based on the constitutional contract
theory, which satisfies the basic requirements stated in
points (1) and (2) of this introduction. This quite long
section is the normative core of the essay, and it makes
the minimum necessary use of the tools of bargaining
games. I apologise if the treatment is nevertheless
cumbersome for the non-technical reader, but any
less use of game theory would have made the for-
mulation of any consistent and precise notion of ra-
tional bargain impossible. Hence in fifth section the
quest for a prescriptive theory of governance and
strategic management – question (3) – is accom-
plished, and I am able to define an objective-function
for the firm consistent with the idea of CSR as a
model of governance. Finally, the sixth section gives
the contractarian account asked for in point (4) and
which can be taken as a potential explanation of the
firm’s emergence.
A definition of CSR as a model of extended
corporate governance
Let me start by suggesting a definition of CSR:
Corporate Social Responsibility is a model of extended
corporate governance whereby those who run a firm
(entrepreneurs, directors and managers) have responsibilities
that range from fulfilment of their fiduciary duties towards
the owners to fulfilment of analogous fiduciary duties to-
wards all the firm’s stakeholders.
This definition is consistent with propositions put
forward in official documents issued by international
organisations.3 Moreover, the definition is consistent
with some of the promises made by the first attempts
to develop a normative stakeholder theory. For
example, Freeman and Evan highlight the fiduciary
relationships between the firm and all its stakeholders
and the ensuing nature of the firm as a tool for
coordinating efforts aimed at satisfying all the
stakeholders’ interests. They therefore suggest (but
unfortunately do not develop in detail) a definition
of corporate governance and strategy based on the
Kantian view that, because all stakeholders are not
merely means for the firm but also ends in them-
selves, their rights and interests should be pursued as
corporate goal by the firm and they should also
participate in decision processes affecting their
interests (see Freeman and Evan 1989, p. 82). Sim-
ilarly, Donaldson and Preston conclude their well-
known essay on the priority of the normative side of
stakeholder theory by stating that a ‘managerial’
stakeholder approach should derive from a complex
view of property rights, which includes not only
claims to control and residual earnings but also the
owner’s constraints and responsibilities toward
stakeholders (see Donaldson and Preston, 1995, pp.
83–85).
To clarify my definition, however, I must define
its basic terms:
(a) Fiduciary duties. Assume that a subject has a
legitimate interest but is unable to make the relevant
decisions, in the sense that s/he does not know what
goals to pursue, what alternatives to choose or how
to deploy his/her resources in order to satisfy his/her
interest. S/he, the trustor, therefore delegates deci-
sions to a trustee empowered to choose actions and
goals. The trustee may thus use the trustor’s
resources and select the appropriate course of action.
For a fiduciary relationship – this being the basis of
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the trustee’s authority vis-a`-vis the trustor – to arise,
the latter must possess a claim (right) towards the
former. In other words, the trustee directs actions
and uses the resources made over to him/her so that
results are obtained which satisfy (to the best extent
possible) the trustor’s interests. These claims (i.e. the
trustor’s rights) impose fiduciary duties on the agent
who is entrusted with authority (the trustee), which
s/he is obliged to fulfil. The fiduciary relation applies
in a wide variety of instances: tutor/minor and tea-
cher/pupil relationships, and (in the corporate do-
main) the relation between the board of a trust and
its beneficiaries, or according to the predominant
opinion, between the board of directors of a joint-
stock company and its shareholders and then more
generally between management and owners (if the
latter do not run the enterprise themselves). By the
term ‘fiduciary duty’, therefore, is meant the duty
(or responsibility) to exercise authority for the good
of those who have granted that authority and are
therefore subject to it.4
(b) Stakeholders. This term denotes individuals or
groups with a major stake in the running of the firm
and who are able to influence it significantly (Freeman
and McVea 2002). However, a distinction should be
drawn between the following two categories:
(i) Stakeholders in the strict sense: those who have
an interest at stake because they have made
specific investments in the firm (in the form
of human capital, financial capital, social
capital or trust, physical or environmental
capital, or for the development of dedicated
technologies etc.) – that is, investments
which may significantly increase the total va-
lue generated by the firm (net of the costs
sustained for that purpose) and which are
made specifically in relation to that firm (and
not to any other) so that their value is idio-
syncratically related to the completion of the
transactions carried out by or in relation to
that firm. These stakeholders are reciprocally
dependent on the firm because they influ-
ence its value but at the same time – given
the specificity of their investment – depend
largely upon it for satisfaction of their well-
being prospects (lock-in effect).
(ii) Stakeholders in the broad sense: those individu-
als or groups whose interest is involved
because they undergo the ‘external effects’,
positive or negative, of the transactions per-
formed by the firm, even if they do not
directly participate in the transaction, so that
they do not contribute to, nor directly
receive value from, the firm.
We are now able to appreciate the scope of CSR
defined as an extended form of governance: it
extends the concept of fiduciary duty from a mono-
stakeholder setting (where the sole stakeholder
relevant to identification of fiduciary duties is the
owner of the firm) to a multi-stakeholder setting in
which the firm owes fiduciary duties to all its
stakeholders (the owners included). It is obvious that
classification of stakeholders on the basis of the
nature of their relationship with the firm must be
regarded as important in gauging these further
fiduciary duties.5
Economic theory and the idea of extended
fiduciary duties
Theory of the firm
Let me now inquire whether economic theory
provides support for the thesis that the firm has
‘extended’ responsibilities towards its stakeholders.
According to neo-institutional theory (Grossman
and Hart 1986; Hansmann 1996; Hart 1995; Hart
and Moore 1990; Williamson 1975, 1986), the firm
emerges as an institutional form of ‘unified transac-
tions governance’ intended to remedy imperfections
in the contracts that regulate exchange relations
among subjects endowed with diverse assets (capital,
labour, instrumental goods, consumption decisions
and so on). These assets, if used jointly, are able to
generate a surplus over the cost of their use that is
higher than in the case of their separate use by each
asset-holder. However, contracts by which these
asset-holders regulate their exchanges are incom-
plete: they do not include provisos covering
unforeseen events, owing to the costs of drafting
them or because the cognitive limits of the human
mind make it impossible to predict all possible states
of the world. Yet for these assets to be used in the
best manner possible, specific investments must be
made: investments undertaken with a view to the
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value that they may produce within an idiosyncratic
contractual relation. This entails that the surplus
generated with respect to the costs sustained by each
party to the exchange is determined by the under-
taking of specific activities with specific counterparts
(suppliers, customers, employees, financiers etc.). Let
us assume that parties behave opportunistically (that
is, they are egoists who act with astuteness). Thus,
once the investments have been made, contractual
incompleteness means that the terms of the contract
can be renegotiated, so that the party in a stronger
ex post position is able to appropriate the entire
surplus, thereby expropriating the other stakehold-
ers. But if agents expect to be expropriated, they will
have no incentive to undertake their investments at
the optimal level. This expectation of unfair treat-
ment gives rise to a loss of efficiency at the social
level.
The firm responds to this problem by bringing the
various transactions under the control of a hierar-
chical authority – the authority, that is, of the party
which owns the firm and through ownership is
entitled to make decisions over the contingencies
that were not ex ante contractible. Unified gover-
nance supplements incomplete contracts with
authority relations through the vertical and hori-
zontal integration of the units that previously made
separate contributions. The firm is therefore a special
contractual form: when contracts lack provisos
contingent upon unforeseen events, they can be
‘completed’ with the ‘residual right of control’ that
entitles its holder to decide what should be done
about decisions not ex ante contractible – that is,
decisions ‘left over’ from the original contract and
which become available only when unforeseen sit-
uations occur.
The residual right of control underpins authority:
those parties with residual right of control may
threaten the other parties to the contract with
exclusion from the physical assets of the firm,
thereby ensuring that ex ante non-contracted deci-
sions are taken ex post to their own advantage. They
are thus safeguarded against opportunism by the
other stakeholders, for they are able to protect the
expected value of their investments in situations
where contract incompleteness allows for margins of
discretion when residual decisions have to be taken.
There is therefore an efficiency rationale for the idea
of the firm as ‘unified governance’ of transactions: if
one party (a class of stakeholders) has made a specific
investment of greater importance than those made
by the others at risk, or if its exercise of ‘unified
governance’ discourages opportunism by the others
to appropriate the surplus, then that party should be
granted the property right and with it the right to
take ‘residual’ decisions. Fiduciary duties owed to
the owners must guarantee that the delegated exer-
cise of residual rights of control by the board of
directors or managers will maintain or improve the
efficiency of the original allocation of property rights
to the selected class of stakeholders.
Abuse of authority
However, one should not underestimate the risks of
the firm qua unified governance. There is not just
one single stakeholder at risk because of contract
incompleteness; it is usually the case that multiple
stakeholders undertake specific investments (invest-
ments in human capital, investments of trust by
consumers, investments of financial capital, invest-
ments by suppliers in raw materials, technologies and
instrumental goods). Contracts with these stake-
holders are also incomplete.
Yet if a firm brings its contracts with certain
stakeholders (labour contracts, obligations towards
and relations with minority shareholders) under the
authority of a party given control over residual
decisions (for example, the controlling shareholder
group) – and more generally if a party is enabled by
its de facto power to exercise discretion over ex ante
non-contractible decisions concerning implicit or
explicit contractual relations with the other stake-
holders (consumers, customers, suppliers, creditors
etc.) – what, one may ask, is there to ensure pro-
tection of investments and interests other than those
of the controlling stakeholder? It is evident that if
fiduciary duties attach only to ownership, those
stakeholders without residual right of control will not
be protected by the fiduciary duties of those who
run the firm.
The inherent risk, therefore, is an abuse of
authority (Sacconi, 1997, 2000). Those wielding
authority may use it to expropriate the specific
investments of others by exploiting ‘gaps’ in con-
tracts – which persist even under unified governance
(in fact it simply allocates to only one stakeholder the
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right to ‘fill’ those gaps with its discretionary
decisions). Those in a position of authority, in fact,
are able to threaten the other stakeholders with
exclusion from access to the physical assets of the
firm, or from the benefits of the contract, to the
point that those other stakeholders become indif-
ferent between accepting the expropriation and
forgoing the value of their investments by with-
drawing from the relation. Thus the entire surplus,
including that part of it imputable to efforts and
investments made by the non-controlling stake-
holders, will be appropriated by the controlling
party. Again, forward-looking stakeholders will be
deterred from entering the hierarchical transaction
with the controlling party. In general, this will
undermine legitimacy (the rational acceptance of
formal authority by the participants in the organi-
sation) and trust. Various stakeholders will ex ante
have a reduced incentive to invest (if they foresee
the risk of abuse), while ex post they will resort to
conflicting or disloyal behaviour (typically possible
when asymmetry of information is inherent in the
execution of some subordinate activity) in the belief
that they are being subjected to abuse of authority.
In the economist’s jargon, this is a ‘second best’ state
of affairs (less than optimum): all governance solu-
tions based on the allocation of property rights to a
single party may approximate social efficiency, but
they can never fully achieve it. This much is
acknowledged by the theoreticians of contractual
incompleteness when they point out that the allo-
cation of the residual right of control induces the
party protected by that right to over-invest, while
those not so protected are induced to under-invest,
with a consequent shortfall with regard to the social
optimum (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995).
My suggestion is therefore that when CSR is
viewed as ‘extended governance’, it completes the
firm as an institution of transactions governance
(Sacconi, 2000, moreover see appendix 1). The firm’s
legitimacy deficit (whatever category of stakeholders
is placed in control of it) is remedied if the residual
control right is accompanied by further fiduciary
duties towards the subjects at risk of abuse of authority
and deprived of the residual control right. At the same
time, this is a move towards greater social efficiency
because it reduces the disincentives and social costs
generated by the abuse of authority. From this
perspective, ‘extended governance’ should comprise:
• the residual control right (ownership) allocated
to the stakeholder with the largest invest-
ments at risk and with relatively low gover-
nance costs, as well as the right to delegate
authority to professional directors and man-
agement;
• the fiduciary duties of those who effectively
(directors and managers) towards the owners,
given that these have delegated control to
them;
• the fiduciary duties of those in a position of
authority in the firm (owners or managers)
towards the non-controlling stakeholders: the
obligation, that is, to run the firm in a
manner such that these stakeholders are not
deprived of their fair shares of the surplus
produced from their specific investments,
and that they are not subject to negative
externalities.
A theory of the constitutional contract
of the firm
The fourth section of this essay outlines the theory of
the constitutional contract of the firm (see also
Sacconi, 2000) as the basis not only for the allocation
of control over the firm - that is, the right to
take discretionary decisions and appropriate the
surplus - but also to include in this structure other
rights – essentially responsibility claims in defence of
stakeholders other than those protected by the property
right. The resulting institutional structure defines the
principles of the firm’s governance structure consis-
tently with the notion of CSR as a governance model
with multiple fiduciary duties.
The model of the constitutional contract of the
firm rests on an analogy between the social contract
theories used to justify ‘by agreement’ both the ‘legal
constitution’ (Buchanan, 1979) and the mutually
advantageous rules of morals (Gauthier, 1986) of a
large society on the one hand, and the economic
theory of efficient choice of the control structure of
firms, based on the idea of contractual incomplete-
ness, on the other (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart
and Moore, 1990; Williamson, 1975). A feature
shared by these theories in particular is the sequential
structure of their models whereby a ‘constitution of
rights’ is initially established and then, in the next
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phase, the parties bargain within the institutional
structure selected in the light of the occurrence of
events, which the constitution is unable to regulate
in every detail. These events explain why some
decisions are only taken in the second period but are
nevertheless influenced by the choice set made
available to the parties by the institutional structure
selected in the initial phase. The theory of the firm
expresses this situation with the concept of the
‘incomplete contracting’ due to unforeseen events
not contractible in detail ex ante in the initial con-
tract. The theory of the firm associates authority
with the allocation of property rights, and I adopt it
in this respect. But I also stress that authority (and
therefore ownership) are legitimate only to the
extent that they are accepted in the constitutional
contract by all the involved parties (the stakehold-
ers). Hence the theory of the constitutional contract
of the firm is much wider in its scope than the
standard theory of the firm.
Rational bargaining on firm constitutions
Assume that an economy consists of N individuals
and that S of them (the stakeholders in the firm) are
engaged in a joint productive activity (in various
roles: employees, investors and capital-lenders,
consumers, suppliers of raw materials, instrumental
goods and technologies, and communities hosting an
activity in a given geographical area). These S
individuals constitute a coalition (for simplicity’s
sake also called S) whose characteristic function is
super-additive: that is, by acting cooperatively they
are able to produce a surplus, which would not be
forthcoming if they acted separately. Of these indi-
viduals, M make specific investments, or they are
‘indispensable’ for specific investments to yield a
surplus. The other members of S instead undertake
unspecific actions or supply unspecific assets which
add value to the coalition S, but they are not strictly
locked into the coalition in order to realise the value
of their investment. Coalition S, as defined here, is
coextensive with the concept of team as used in the
theory of the firm. Accordingly, ownership and
authority over the team should be allocated to one of
the M members of S. The other members of S are
stakeholders tied to S by relations of varying degrees
of intensity. The remaining N–S individuals are
indifferent to the activity in question (they are not
stakeholders in the strict sense given to the term by
the theory).
The model depicts a two-step collective decision-
making situation among potential members of the
coalition S.6 The main collective decisions are taken
at the beginning and in the third period, while in the
intermediate periods individual decisions are taken
and information is gathered. At time t=0 the allo-
cation of rights is decided (rights not only of own-
ership and control but also of redress and
compensation), and this determines the control
structure exerted over the productive coalition S
through a constitutional agreement. At time t=1 the
right-holding individuals undertake investment
decisions with a view to subsequent transactions and
joint activities in the coalition. At time t=2 events
occur which are not covered by a clause in the initial
contract. At time t=3 a new bargaining game begins,
defined for each allocation of rights and for every set
of investment decisions. That is, the members of the
coalition S negotiate a joint plan of action and a
distribution of the surplus which reflects investments
and events occurred in t=2. This problem of
sequential collective decision-making is modelled as
a compounded bargaining game GC on the consti-
tutional and post-constitutional choice. Its first phase
is the bargaining game carried out at time t=0, when
chosen for each player is a set of strategies by means
of which a subsequent game can be played at time
t=3. Note that this set of strategies is a subset of the
strategies available in the initial game.
In the background to the constitutional choice
game there is a ‘state-of-nature game’ to which the
players will resort if they fail to agree cooperatively
on a constitution. The underlying ‘state-of-nature
game’ admits a single solution which is mutually
disadvantageous to all parties, namely a sub-optimal
equilibrium. In the theory-of-firm model the ‘state-
of-nature’ is the situation that arises if contracts are
renegotiated without any protection, so that the
parties undergo reciprocal opportunistic behaviours
made possible by incompleteness of the initial con-
tract. Players anticipate this unpleasant outcome at
the initial phase of the constitutional choice as the
‘status quo’ that would result in the absence of a
constitutional framework. Analytically, therefore,
the constitutional choice game GC has as its admis-
sible outcomes the resumption of the ‘state-of-nature’
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result, but also all the other possible outcomes in the
‘state-of-nature’, and all the (linear) combinations
among those outcomes. In other words, the tech-
nological frontier available to the parties has not
changed, but now, following agreements, the insti-
tutional arrangement makes it possible concretely to
obtain all the outcomes that were previously only
virtually possible, and also all the combinations
among them.
It is obviously necessary to explain how binding
agreements are made possible by moving from the
state-of-nature game to the constitutional choice
game. The explanation is that the former is a non-
cooperative game, of ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ type, whilst
the latter GC is a cooperative bargaining game where, if
agreement is reached on a joint plan of action, it is
certain that this plan will be implemented. Of course,
there is no reason to believe that opting for a con-
stitution rather than for concrete contracts is in itself
sufficient to make agreements binding. Thus my
explanation is simply that the constitutional choice
game is a hypothetical (ethical) normative model in
which the parties intend to ‘justify’ their choice of the
constitution and believe that they can act on the basis
of what they deem to be right. Given that they are
counterfactually considering a hypothetical state of
the world in which they are simply seeking a solution
agreeable to all parties, one may also hypothesise that
they presume themselves able to keep to the agree-
ments reached if these have been negotiated ratio-
nally (this too is an acceptable hypothesis for an
hypothetical justificatory model). How this solution
may be implemented will be discussed in Part Two of
this essay (see Sacconi, 2004b).
The distinctive feature of the constitutional
choice game GC is that the players (potential
members of S) do not have to choose one particular
joint strategy. Rather, they simply have to choose a
subset of the set of admissible joint strategies (that is,
a restriction on each player’s set of strategies). Each
subset of the strategies of the game Gc sets a limi-
tation on the freedom of action that the players
enjoy in the ‘state of nature’. Thus the choice of any
whatever subset of possible strategies coincides with
the choice of a ‘constitution’. Moreover, each subset
of the joint strategies (constitution) in its turn defines
a cooperative sub-game whose admissible outcomes
cover only a portion of the outcomes admissible in
GC. This is a coalition game in which the players
negotiate on how much they can obtain from
cooperation according to their importance for the
production of surplus (investments) and according to
the constitutional rights that entitle them to take
decisions that may influence the final value of
cooperation with the others.
Individuals who are candidates for coalition S
therefore take part in a sequential game. I assume
that they resolve the game by starting with the
admissible outcomes of the post-constitutional phase
and working backwards to the constitutional choice
(backwards induction). Consequently, all the
admissible outcomes and the solutions of the post-
constitutional sub-games can be anticipated before
the constitutional choice has been taken. This
important simplification can be made in analogy to
the theory of incomplete contracts (Grossman and
Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995; Hart and Moore 1990;
Tirole 1999), with the caveat that in the real world of
bounded rationality and effectively incomplete
contracts, the parties will counterfactually recon-
struct the ex post situation in light of the constitu-
tional contract they would have agreed upon if they
had been able ex ante to foresee the ex post situations.
They will therefore apply the abstract principle of a
fair contract according to the information available at
that point in time, and they will verify ex post
whether it has been applied amid the contingencies
which have arisen in the meantime.
With this caveat I therefore assume that, in the
second stage, payoffs are assigned according to the
solution for coalitional cooperative games known as
the Shapley value and whereby each player obtains
the expected payoff of the sum over all the possible
sub-coalitions of S of the differences between the
coalition value when he is the last to enter and when
he does not participate, multiplied by the probability
that each sub-coalitions will form. Given hypo-
thetically each sub-game, and the relative decisions
permitted by rights, players calculate the payoff as-
signed to each of them by the Shapley value (Shapley,
1953) for each bargaining game that follows every
given level of investments. They therefore choose
the level of investment that enables them to obtain
the highest payoff, on the hypothesis that the others
too will choose the level of investment at which they
obtain the highest payoff. Thus for every post-con-
stitutional sub-game there exists a univocal solution
in terms of a precisely defined set of payoffs.
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Moving backwards to the initial phase of the
constitutional choice, the question arises as to how
this phase is handled. Each player knows that the
choice of a subset of strategies (a constitution) gives
rise to a particular solution for the associated sub-
game. The space of the feasible outcomes of the
constitutional choice may therefore be regarded as
the set of the solutions of all the logically possible
post-constitutional sub-games. Consequently, the
GC game too can be treated as a cooperative
bargaining game in which the players must agree
upon a particular outcome selected within an
admissible outcomes space (each point belonging to
it corresponds to the solution of an alternative
post-constitutional game). The constitutional
choice must be made unanimously by all the po-
tential members of S. In fact, the only rational
agreement is the one that involves all the members
of the large coalition S, for if this agreement is not
reached they will fail in their attempt to establish a
constitution, and they are doomed to play the
‘state of nature’ game with its sub-optimal solution
d*. Point d* is therefore the status quo of the GC
bargaining game. Consequently, the constitutional
choice game is the typical cooperative bargaining
game in which by unanimous agreement an effi-
cient solution must be chosen from among all
possible ones (set of Pareto outcomes), given the
minimum condition that each acceptable agree-
ment must give the parties at least what they
would obtain in the status quo d*.
Nash bargaining solution
The most accredited solution for bargaining prob-
lems of this kind is the Nash bargaining solution: that
is, the point on the efficient frontier of the admis-
sible outcome space where the product among the
players’ utilities is maximum net of the value to them
of the status quo (Nash, 1950). The solution follows
from very general postulates demonstrated to be
coincident with various other formulations of the
rationality criteria for bargaining processes among
Bayesian rational players (Binmore and Dasgupta
1987; Harsanyi, 1977). Suffice it to say that if the
space of the bargaining outcomes net of the status quo
is symmetrical – that is, it includes for each player
exactly all the payoffs that can be obtained from the
other players – then the solution, which lies on the
efficient outcomes frontier, must itself be symmet-
rical. It must, that is to say, distribute the utility gains
with respect to the status quo (the surplus) in equal
parts among the bargaining parties. Under certain
conditions of invariance of the solution (i) to
changes in the units of measurement of the players’
utilities (ii) to changes in the payoff space which
eliminate irrelevant bargaining alternatives and (iii)
to symmetric permutations of the players’ positions
with respect to a symmetrical payoff space, one
concludes that the only solution compatible with the
postulates is maximisation of the Nash product.
Let us consider a case with two players, 1 and 2,
and let us assume that the solution is a point in space
R2 enclosed between the positive Cartesian axes U1
and U2, each of which measures the utility for a
player of the cooperative game outcomes (see Fig-
ure 1 for this example). The space therefore repre-
sents the outcomes subject to bargaining in terms of
their utility value for the players (i.e. their payoffs).
The standard analytical assumption is that the payoff
space is convex and compact. The payoff space P
therefore has an efficient frontier (in the upper-right
positive quadrant of the Cartesian plane) which
represents the set of outcomes for which the players’
utilities cannot be increased by an alternative
agreement without reducing the utility of at least
one other player. Below this frontier are agreements
with respect to which gains are still possible for all;
above it are outcomes unfeasible by any agreement
or joint plan of action. All points in the space rep-
resent different possible values of the coalition
among the two players. In fact, only when both of
them agree on a solution to the game can they leave
the status quo d*, which is represented by an internal
point of the space, so that they can benefit from
cooperation. The characteristic function of the
coalition between both players is therefore super-
additive (it is better to agree than not to agree).
Obviously, of interest are only those agreements for
which there is an efficient allocation.
But at what point among those on the frontier
should the agreement be reached? The Nash bar-
gaining solution states that the players will agree on the
joint strategy corresponding to the point on the
frontier where the maximum product of the indi-
vidual surpluses holds, i.e. MaxPi(Ui)di) (with i=1, 2
denoting the various participants in the bargaining
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game), where Ui is the utility deriving to the generic
stakeholder i from the cooperative transaction that it
undertakes with the firm, and di is the status quo payoff
coinciding with the repayment of the cost specific
investments made by i in order to participate in the
joint action plan (that is, i always at least recoups the
cost of its specific investment). The solution assumes
that bargaining should provide each player with at
least a net advantage, which is the difference between
the share of the surplus received and the status quo
value. As a consequence of additional rationality
postulates, these net individual advantages can be
identified as being such that their product is the maxi-
mum among those in the set of the possible outcomes
of the cooperation. We may say that this is the col-
lective choice function adopted by the members of the
coalition, in light of their bargaining, to resolve the
problem of their joint action. Note that the ratio at
which the shares of the surplus a1/a2 are distributed is
proportional to the ratio between the marginal vari-
ations in the players’ utilities ¶U1/¶U2=)a1/a2.
In the constitutional choice-bargaining game this
solution has to be reached within a symmetrical out-
come space P generated, as said, by all the virtual
outcomes of the ‘state of nature’ and their convex
combination. The space P equates the set of all the
logically possible subsets of the set of strategies of the
constitutional choice game – so that all the points in
this space can also be interpreted as solutions for
possible post-constitutional games. The Nash bar-
gaining solution of the constitutional choice game
therefore corresponds to a constitution on the basis of
which a particular post-constitutional game begins
once the admissible strategies have been selected.
Whilist this subgame will assure to the players payoffs
consistent with their Shapley value, it also will dis-
tribute to the players equal parts of the cooperative
surplus calculated with respect to the constitutional
outcome space (in the units of measurement of each
player). This constitution obviously distributes the set
of rights – among them the right to ownership and
governance within the firm (coalition S) – so that no
party has an advantageous bargaining position when
the post-constitutional bargaining takes place.
Rational contracting and distributive justice
What interpretation can we give to the solution of the
game GC in terms of the theory of distributive justice?
(a) Rational bargaining as impartiality. Rational
bargaining comprises an elementary notion of
impartiality of choice, given that not only do all the
parties rationally accept the solution (which is
therefore equally rational for them all) but the
solution is anonymous: in fact, the Nash product
remains unchanged under symmetrical permutation
of place among the players. If the players change
their place with respect to the set of strategies and
the utilities associated with them, so that all the
results that player A could previously obtain are
now achievable by player B, and vice versa, then
the solution will coincide with the same Nash
product and it will offer to player A exactly what it
previously offered to player B (and vice versa).
Hence the solution is anonymous and not attached
to the name or personal identity of the player. In
particular, if the payoff space is symmetrical, when
the players change place with respect the strategies
and outcomes, the solution will not change: it is,
that is to say, exactly the same point in the space
and the same cooperation pattern with permuted
roles. This means that the only relevant features are
the possibilities to contribute to the cooperation
and their evaluation in terms of the participants’
utility. Let me assume the standpoint of an
impartial observer who wants to find a collective
solution that impartially reflects these features (and
which is therefore acceptable to all). If I examine
the bargaining problem from all the individual
points of view, assuming the position of each
participant in bargaining in turn, I reach the
U1
U2
Max ∏(Ui-di) 
where 
∂U1/∂U2 = - a1/a2P
a1/a2
d*
Figure 1. A symmetrical two players cooperative bar-
gaining game and its Nash solution.
A Social Contract Account for CSR 269
conclusion that each of them accepts a solution
which is exactly the same as the one accepted by all
the others: the Nash bargaining solution. In other
words, the Nash solution is the solution that the
observer would obtain by reasoning from the point
of view of any whatever participant.
(b) Moralised status quo. The impartiality of bar-
gaining is obviously limited by the fact that it is
affected by the status quo: that is, what the parties
could have obtained in any case without cooperation
will be conserved by the bargaining solution. This is
a fundamental tenet of bargaining theory: why
should the parties be interested in adhering to the
agreement if they can obtain greater utility by stay-
ing out of it? The fact remains, however, that the
surplus to be distributed is calculated within the
payoff space on the basis of the status quo. Conse-
quently, the better the status quo for a participant, the
higher the payoff from bargaining. But if the status
quo reflects ‘force’ or ‘fraud’, these morally arbitrary
features will be preserved by the bargaining solution.
But consider the actual relevance of this classic
objection (Rawls, Sen and Brian Barry, for example,
have made it in various ways). The hypothetical
social contract expresses a model for the choice of
social institutions which are antecedent to any form
of social interaction that will be responsible – for
example via the social division of labour – for costs
and benefits allocated amongst the participants in
social interaction. It is therefore clear that no form of
social injustice can be represented in the status quo.
What is to be eliminated is consequently the arbi-
trariness due to the reciprocal use of natural force and
fraud in the ‘state of nature’.7 This difficulty is
avoided by conventionally setting the status quo for
each party to zero. All the effects of the damaging
natural interaction among the parties must be neu-
tralised if each of them is to agree to play the game of
justifying the social institution by agreement. Zero-
setting the status quo for all parties has another
important property: no player at the outset of the
constitutional bargaining game will have already
borne the costs of the specific investments which
ex post (at time t=3) may induce him to acquiesce to
unfair payoffs in order to recover at least those costs.
By contrast, the status quo which is taken as given
when the constitutional solution is chosen ensures to
each player at least the payoff that he had before
bearing the costs of the investment (which are
instead reflected in the costs/benefits balance asso-
ciated with each joint strategy). Given that in the
constitutional choice I select a post-constitutional
game with a specified final allocation of payoffs, the
constitutional choice will never be subject to the
lock-in effect that characterizes the renegotiation of
contracts in the theory of the firm.
(c) Correspondence to intuitive principles of justice. The
sequential bargaining-game solution can be given an
ethical interpretation not only because of the neu-
trality of rational bargaining but also on the basis of
the correspondence between each of the two con-
cepts of solution I have employed and the intuitive
principle of justice appropriate to the respective
bargaining phase in question. The solution to each
post-constitutional game according to the Shapley
value can be interpreted as an application of the
principle of remuneration on the basis of relative contri-
bution. The Shapley value is in fact the linear com-
bination (weighted with equal probability assigned
to all the coalitions with the same number of
members) of the marginal contributions that an
individual can make to all the coalitions. On the
other hand, the Nash bargaining solution – provided
the units of measure for the individual utilities are
assumed to be interpersonally calibrated (which is
not required for simple calculation of the Nash
bargaining solution) – can be interpreted as an
equivalent solution to the distribution proportional
to relative needs, that is, proportional to the relative
intensity of variation in preference for the players at
the point where the solution falls. This is the con-
sequence of what was shown in the previous section,
where I said that the ratio at which the shares of the
surplus are distributed to the players is proportional
to the ratio between the marginal variations in the
players’ utilities ¶U1/¶U2=)a1/a2. In fact, once the
utility units are interpersonally calibrated, so that
each unit expresses the same magnitude of prefer-
ence for both the players, the ratio between their
marginal variation measures the players’ relative
needs (see Brock, 1979; Sacconi 1991, 2000).
The twofold ethical characterisation of the bar-
gaining solutions matches the different nature of the
problems of collective choice modelled by the post-
constitutional games on the one hand, and the
constitutional choice game GC on the other. Before
they play a post-constitutional sub-game, the parties
undertake their specific investments bearing in mind
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the guarantees offered by the constitution in regard
to their possibilities of reaping the benefits of
cooperation. They then calculate the effect of their
participation in each possible sub-coalition of S, and
finally contract with S the part due to them for
concluding an agreement which will enable S to
pursue its best joint strategy associated with which is
a super-additive production function (or character-
istic function). The solution of each sub-game dis-
tributes benefits to which the players have already
contributed through their investment decisions and
through their decision to join the coalition
S. Therefore, appropriate at this point is the distri-
bution criterion based on relative contribution or, put
otherwise, relative merits. Instead, in the case of the
constitutional bargaining game GC, none of the
parties subscribing to the agreement has yet con-
tributed anything, so that the merit or relative
contribution criterion does not seem to be a valid
criterion of distributive justice in this case. Chosen
in GC is the constitution on the basis of which the
investment decisions will be taken. What the various
players will be willing to contribute depends on
which constitution is chosen. These rights-for-
incentives, however, must be incorporated into an
agreement among participants in the constitutional
bargaining phase, which considers only what is rel-
evant from their current point of view. In the ab-
sence of any relevance of merit, in this case only
needs can matter for the players’ agreement. Hence
an appropriate criterion for the solution will refer to
the relative needs of the parties in regard to what will
subsequently enable them to contribute to the
cooperative production.
To conclude, the solution to the game of con-
stitutional choice consists of the following rule for
constitutional choice:
(i) select a socially Pareto efficient constitution
calculated on the basis of the particular sta-
tus quo (0, 0) which
(ii) distributes the surplus generated by the coop-
eration among the members of S in propor-
tion to their relative needs if the distribution
is seen in the context of the constitutional
choice (with respect to the payoffs space P
of the GC constitutional choice),
(iii) but also proportionally to their relative contribu-
tions, if seen in the context of the post-con-
stitutional choice, which occurs in the
coalition sub-game that begins after the con-
stitution has been chosen.
Exclusive property rights and the duty to compensate
non-controlling parties
We have thus far considered the more abstract case
in which every logically possible constitution is subject
to constitutional choice. In this case, every point in
the payoff space of the constitutional choice game
corresponds to the solution of an admissible con-
stitution (subset of strategies). This would be a world
in which it is possible to allocate decision rights in
whatever proportion among the parties. In other
words, institutions that greatly restrict freedom are
just as possible as extremely liberal ones, and like-
wise institutions which impose every intermediate
restrictions or which grant rights to a greater or
lesser extent to one or other participant. Given that
the choice can be made from such a wide range of
options, the achievable institutions would be per-
fectly efficient and fair, and they would not be
subject to the second-best results typical of the
theory of the firm.
But hypothesise more realistically – as instead
suggested by the modern theory of property rights –
that only a certain number of restrictions on the
set of the strategies of the base GC game are
institutionally feasible. I shall regard as institutionally
feasible a constitution under which a relationship of
authority can be established whereby any contract
made between the parties can be enforced and any
gap in ex ante contracts can be completed ex post. Let
us assume that only exclusive allocations of property
rights on all the physical assets of the firm are insti-
tutionally feasible. Connected to this is the possi-
bility of assigning all authority to some or other
party, but not intermediate degrees of authority (as
in the egalitarian solution found previously). Let us
therefore assume that the ownership arrangements
allowed by the feasible constitutions are such as to
bias post-constitutional bargaining heavily in favour
of one or other party. Corresponding to these
constitutions are particular post-constitutional games
whose admissible outcomes all together cover only a
portion of the outcome space obtained in GC from
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the original ‘state of nature’ game. The salient aspect
of this situation is that the Nash bargaining solution
with respect to the all-inclusive payoff space of the
GC game may now not coincide with the solution of
any of the institutionally feasible sub-games, simply
because the choice must fall within the set of
institutionally feasible solutions, setting aside the other
outcomes as ‘Utopian’ (even though they are more
efficient and fairer).
How should we deal with the constitutional
choice in this imperfect world? If one party is able to
ensure a higher surplus when endowed with own-
ership, he may be able to purchase the property right
from the other party. If we take as the status quo an
arrangement of rights under which one party has
ownership, we can verify that the alternative
arrangement of property rights is more efficient if it
is possible to find a utility side-payment which
enables the second party to induce the first to cede to
him the property right. This entails choosing the
feasible post-constitutional sub-game whose solution
is closest to the Pareto frontier of the game.
However, the rational consent of the other agents
must also be accounted for in the context of the
constitutional bargaining model. The other agents
may be ready to accept that the player making the
most valuable investment or who is most indispens-
able to realising the value of these investments should
be given property rights. Nevertheless, making the
constitutional choice requires the consent of all the
players whose membership in the coalition ensures
the super-additivity of the value of S (whether they
make specific investments, are indispensable agents
with respect to some assets or ordinary members of S
who add some value to the coalition).
Fortunately, we can still calculate the fair distri-
bution that recognises the legitimate claims of the
parties. The initial position is ‘without rights’, so that
the appropriate status quo of an S person game is
therefore 0 for each player. Contribution-based
claims are not relevant here because in GC the
contributions have not yet been made. Investments
come into play only before the sub-games are
played. Distribution according to the criterion of
relative need can now be calculated by taking as the
set of feasible outcomes the convex hull of all the
linear combination of points in the payoff spaces
defined by the institutionally feasible games and the
status quo, in a two person case (0,0). Within this set
of points, the Nash bargaining solution permits
isolation of a fair payoff distribution. This solution is
clearly different from the constitutional contract in
the Utopian context, since in general the combination
of the two or more payoff spaces relative to insti-
tutionally feasible games (constitutions) Gi is only a
subset of the payoff space of the constitutional choice
game GC and does not necessarily includes all the
north-east frontier of the GC payoff space(see Figure
2 for a two-person, two-feasible-constitution case).
The problem, however, is that neither one of the
solutions of feasible constitutional sub-games may
even correspond to this recalculation of the Nash
bargaining solution games, the fair solution is a linear
combination of their two solutions, that is, a mid-
way between them, which may not belong to either
of the two spaces of feasible games). Hence the
solution that can be suggested is based on a utility
side-payment. In order to get from the status quo (0,0)
to the most efficient solution of a particular sub-
game, the player who wants to obtain a position of
advantage must underwrite a utility side-payment.
On conclusion of this payment, the distributions of
payoffs will conform to the criterion of distribution
proportional to relative need, despite the fact that
with this particular arrangement of property rights
he is able to obtain a larger portion of the surplus
than the other parties. By way of example (see again
Figure 2), consider the case of two players. If A is
more efficient (because his investment is more
important), this means that there is one feasible
constitution C1 which assigns ownership to A and
defines a sub-game G1 with a payoff space P1 whose
solution is more efficient than that of the alternative
constitution C2 which assigns the property to B and
defines a sub-game G2 with payoff space P2. Thus,
for reasons of incentive, ownership must be given to
A. However, in order to obtain ownership A must
still take account of B’s claims and compensate him.
The constitutional contract stipulates that the fair
distribution must correspond to the point in which the
two members of the cooperative coalition will be
remunerated in proportion to their relative needs.
The solution is calculated, as in Figure 2, within the
payoff space P3 generated as the convex hull of the
linear combinations of the outcomes associated with
the actually feasible constitutions. This requires utility
side-payments by which A compensates B until the
cooperative surplus is distributed according to the
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criterion of relative need. The idea of compensation
obviously requires the firm’s institutional structure to
incorporate a notion of ‘social responsibility’, by
which is meant the obligation of the party to whom own-
ership is allocated to compensate the other parties to the social
contract for the advantage that he has acquired by being
granted authority over the firm. Even though, under the
outcome resulting immediately from the constitu-
tional sub-game selected, the party with authority has
legal means to appropriate an extra-rent, this extra-
rent must be reimbursed in accordance with the
principle of constitutional choice based on relative
needs.
The constitutional contract therefore stipulates
the following institutional structure of the firm in
the imperfect world of institutionally feasible consti-
tutions:
(i) Assuming that the N–S members remain
indifferent and therefore do not undergo
negative external effects from the firm.
(ii) The firm constituted by the coalition S will
be headed by the party under whose gover-
nance the Shapley-value solution distributes
to the various stakeholders an aggregate va-
lue that is greater than the alternatives;
(iii) This governing party will have the right to
take residual decisions or delegate them to
the management and take the residual on
the proviso that
(iv) The cooperative surplus made possible by
the constitutional arrangement selected is
measured from a status quo including ‘cover-
age’ of the costs borne by each stakeholder
in making its specific investment (that is, it
is free from the ‘lock-in’ effect),
(v) Each member of the coalition S obtains a
share of the surplus that reflects its relative
contribution to the value of the coalition S
in the institutional form selected,
(vi) To which must be added (or subtracted) a
quota by virtue of which the final distribu-
tion is equal to the distribution proportional
to relative needs defined in the constitu-
tional phase with respect to the set of insti-
tutionally feasible outcomes.
This concludes my deduction of the institutional
framework for corporate governance of the socially
responsible firm from a normative model of rational
bargaining.
An objective-function for the firm
The main objection brought against CSR is that the
multi-stakeholder approach to the firm’s governance
leaves management without a clearly stated and
uniquely defined ‘bottom line’ to be used as the
benchmark against which to evaluate its success or
failure (Jensen, 2001). The consequence, the argu-
ment runs, is that the management exploits this sit-
uation to pursue its personal interests. It comes up
with every possible device to conceal its essentially
self-dealing behaviour behind the interests of some
or other stakeholder. Whereas, the critics of CSR
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Figure 2. P1 and P2 are payoff spaces for the institutionally feasible Constitutions C1 and C2, the solution to P3 is
the constitutional contract which can be reached only by a utility side payment.
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maintain, it is easy to check the managerial strategy
(among the alternatives available at any particular
time) against the criterion of increasing the firm’s
profits as much as possible, this is not the case of
‘stakeholder value’, since this consists of numerous
dimensions to maximise simultaneously (the interests
of the various stakeholders). Consequently, stake-
holder value contains an intrinsic contradiction – the
pursuit of conflicting, or at any rate divergent, goals
at the same time – so that the choice of which
strategy to adopt is ultimately left to mere managerial
discretion.8 In sum, this objection amounts to saying
that the multi-stakeholder approach cannot provide
the firm with prescriptive guidance as clear as profit
maximisation.
It should be clear, however, that this objection
does not apply to the model of the social contract of
the firm proposed here – which by no means ignores
the existence of a distributive conflict, and instead
resolves it by identifying a bargaining equilibrium
that permits mutual cooperation among the mem-
bers of the team. Once the firm is understood as a
team of participants with specific investments at
stake, the metaphor of a ‘bargaining cooperative
game’ among multiple stakeholders can be used.
Stakeholders must agree on a shared action plan (a
joint strategy), which allocates tasks among the
members of the team so that the contribution of
each of them is efficient (because it produces the
maximum surplus net of each stakeholder’s costs).
The ‘bargaining cooperative game’ played by the
stakeholders is typically one of mixed interests. Al-
though it is in their common interest to cooperate,
because this enables them to produce a surplus that
would otherwise be impossible, conflict nevertheless
persists among the stakeholders over the distribution
of the value created. ‘Governance’ and strategic
management consequently consist in solution of the
problems of identifying the joint strategy that the
stakeholders (as the players in the cooperative game)
may utilise to coordinate themselves – so that stra-
tegic management can reduce bargaining costs (time,
conflict etc.) and the costs of gathering information
on the alternatives available and on the intentions of
each players concerning cooperation.
As we saw in the previous section, the counterpart
to the philosophical contractarian model is a math-
ematical model of rational bargaining. If the bar-
gaining outcome space is well defined and if the
Nash or Harsanyi-Zeuthen postulates of bargaining
theory are accepted, the solution is defined uniquely,
so that the set of admissible solutions reduces to one
single alternative corresponding to the Nash bar-
gaining solution (Harsanyi, 1977; Nash, 1950). In
any event, various theories of bargaining yield
solutions which resemble each other quite closely –
see Gauthier (1986), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)
and Rubinstein (1987) – because they are slight
variations on the basic Nash’s solution; and for the
purposes of this study, identifying a set of ‘close’
solutions compatible with the idea of rational
bargaining seems sufficient.
Note that the bargaining solution is just as com-
putable as the firm’s profit function in microeco-
nomic theory. Hence I can simply substitute
maximisation of the function which assigns the
solution to the bargaining game for profit maximi-
sation, and assume this as the firm’s computable
objective-function. This solution is simultaneously
an answer to both the problem of cooperation and
distributive conflict among the stakeholders. Thus
the quest for simultaneous satisfaction of multiple
possibly conflicting objectives is accomplished by
maximisation of a unique solution function defined
on the outcome space.
Note also that the bargaining equilibrium does
not need operational interpersonal comparisons of
utility (which are operationally very problematic) in
order to be calculated (interpersonal comparisons
can be confined to the interpretive level9). It is
therefore not informatively over-demanding as re-
gards what the manager needs to know about the
intensity of stakeholders’ preferences. It obeys, in
fact, simple axioms of individual rationality in bar-
gaining – like the decision to grant a concession
according to expected personal utility, given the
probability that the counterparty will accept or re-
fuse it, or that a player will not make a concession
that he or she would not expect the counterparty to
make in a similar situation – and conditions of
mutually expected rationality. Of course, if these
postulates are taken literally, they can be criticised as
unrealistic; and it is likely that in the real world
agents are unable to maximise or to estimate prob-
abilities coherently, or to make accurate forecasts
about the rational behaviour of others. But what
matters for my purposes here is that these postulates
are a good approximation of rational behaviour in a
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hypothetical (ideal) bargaining situation among
stakeholders, while at the same time they provide
prescriptive guidance for strategic management –
guidance no less prescriptive and clear than the profit
maximisation advocated by critics of CSR like Mi-
chael Jensen. Of course, bounded rationality is still a
major issue, which needs to be faced when imple-
mentation will come under scrutiny (see Sacconi
2004b).
The social contract as potential explanation
of the firm’s emergence
Thus far, the social contract has been presented as a
normative theory by which to identify the terms of
an agreement that would be acceptable from both a
rational bargaining perspective and an impartial
standpoint – that is, from the point of view of any
whatever stakeholder. However, social contract
theory can also furnish a reconstruction – under-
stood as a ‘potential explanation’ – of how bar-
gaining may give rise to a firm with both fiduciary
duties towards the owners and social responsibility
(i.e. further fiduciary duties) towards all the stake-
holders.
Consider the ‘state of nature’ prior to the creation
of the firm. Bilateral transactions among stakeholders
regulated by incomplete contracts are subject to
reciprocal opportunistic behaviour, with the conse-
quence that prohibitive bargaining costs render them
inefficient. At the same time, the parties to those
transactions are entirely unconcerned about the
negative external effects of their transactions on other
agents, who although they do not participate, are
nevertheless affected. This is a Hobbesian scenario in
which the life of those involved in economic trans-
actions is ‘‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short’’.10
The stakeholders thus address the problem of creating
an association whereby all their transactions can be
undertaken in accordance with agreed-to rules and
are therefore not subject to contract-costs, while at
the same time the negative effects on those who do
not participate in the benefits from the transactions
are reduced to the minimum. The ‘First Social
Contract’ of the firm (pactum unionis) is nothing other
than the agreement, which the stakeholders reach
among themselves to set up this association. They
negotiate on the association’s constitution, which
consists in a common plan of action (joint strategy) to
which each of them contributes either by making a
positive effort or by simply refraining from applying
his/her veto. This first social contract of the firm
stipulates as follows:
(a) rejection of shared plans of action which
generate negative externalities for those not
participating in the cooperative venture or, if
these negative externalities are essential for
the production of the cooperative surplus, a
compensation of third parties so that they are
rendered neutral;
(b) production of the maximum surplus possible
(difference between the value of the product
for its consumers, who also belong to the asso-
ciation, and the costs sustained by each stake-
holder to provide inputs for producing it);
(c) a distribution of the surplus which is ‘fair’,
or rationally acceptable to each stakeholder
in a bargaining process free from force or
fraud and based on an equitable status quo,
that is, considering the surplus net of the
costs of specific investments.
However, if an attempt is made to reach this form of
an ideal association (the ‘just firm’) which eliminates
all the participants’ contract-costs, arrived at in
practice is an organisational form which is found to
be inefficient from the point of view of its gover-
nance costs. Stakeholders discover, for example, that
the general assembly of all members is unable to take
coherent decisions in a reasonable amount of time.
In the absence of a monitoring system, even if the
members of the association have established fair
shares of the surplus to be distributed among them,
they have an incentive to act opportunistically and
not to play their part. Coordination problems arise
on how the joint strategy can be implemented under
changing circumstances, which may alter beliefs and
reciprocal expectations asymmetrically. The stake-
holders consequently draw up a second social contract of
the firm (pactum subjections)11 by which they consti-
tute, in the proper sense of the term, a governance
structure for the association. It is only now that the
association becomes a hierarchical structure.
The second social contract provides that authority
should be delegated to the stakeholder most efficient
in performing governance functions (the taking of
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residual decisions, devising coordination solutions as
circumstances change, monitoring, the enactment of
sanctions, excluding potential free riders etc.). For
this reason, it can also be seen as a contract between
the stakeholders and those who are given control over
the firm (social contract with the firm). After com-
parative examination of the governance costs asso-
ciated to each stakeholder running the firm, the
stakeholder with the lowest costs is selected and as-
signed ownership, and is therefore the one to which
the right of governing the association is delegated
(Hansmann, 1996). This class, which is remunerated
with the residual, also is authorised to delegate some
discretionary decisions and to appoint those who
will be in the authority position of running the firm.
Prima facie, their authority will be effectively con-
stituted – that is, the delegation will remain valid – as
long as they comply with what I call
• Narrow fiduciary proviso: the owners are remu-
nerated with the maximum residual revenue
possible (in forms compatible with the di-
verse nature of the controlling stakeholder)
in the light of conditions obtaining in the
firm’s specific market.
However, it is evident that this proviso entails that
the positions of the other stakeholders change.
Formerly co-equal members of the association, they
are now subject in various ways to the discretionary
decisions taken by the stakeholder invested with
authority, and by the appointed directors. Unlike in
the standard economic theory of the firm, in the
social contract theory the risk of the abuse of
authority can be squarely faced. The second social
contract is therefore conceived in a manner such that
this cost of hierarchy is forestalled as well. Hence,
under the second social contract, stakeholders agree
to submit to authority, thereby rendering it effec-
tive, if the contract stipulates that the firm’s new
governance structure will comply with fiduciary
duties towards all the stakeholders (owners and
non-owners).
• Extended fiduciary proviso:
(i) Towards non-owners: The firm must abstain
from activities which impose negative exter-
nal effects on stakeholders not party to trans-
actions, or compensate them so that they
remain neutral. Moreover, the firm must
remunerate the stakeholders participating in
the firm’s transactions with pay-offs (mone-
tary or of other kinds, for example in terms
of the quantity, quality and prices of goods,
services, working conditions etc.) which
taken a fair status quo for granted, must con-
tain a part of the surplus (assuming that this
is positive) such to approximate fair/efficient
shares as envisaged by the first social con-
tract.12
(ii) Toward owners: The firm must remunerate the
owners with the maximum residual compati-
ble with fair remuneration – as defined by the
first social contract – of the efficient
contributions made by all the other stakehold-
ers.
The dependence of the narrow proviso on the ex-
tended proviso in the second social contract reflects
the sequential structure of the constitutional model
developed in section four. There the implementation
of an ownership structure in the post-constitutional
phase – able to remunerate merits and incentive
investments – was compatible with the choice made
from the first-phase constitutional viewpoint in
which the social contract on institutions was consis-
tent with the criterion of stakeholders’ relative needs.
Here, instead, the second social contract solves the
problem of minimizing governance costs and allo-
cating rent under the constraint of satisfying the first
social contact, which concerns the constitution of the
productive association, or team, and is identified by a
cooperative bargaining solution. It consequently
must also be coherent with the relative needs distri-
bution principle.
Conclusion
Normative stakeholder theories have failed in various
ways to specify a criterion for striking a balance
among a firm’s stakeholders. This is because they
have not adequately addressed the problem from the
point of view of designing the institutional gover-
nance structure of the firm: that is, the complex set of
rights which establishes the legitimate claims (of
various kinds) of both the stakeholders with
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ownership and control and the other stakeholders
that in various ways participate in the firm, exchange
with it or simply are subjected to external effects. To
do so, they should have neither restricted themselves
to the managerial (i.e. micro) level, however essential
it may be, nor excessively enlarged their scope to
include the macro-social contract as a whole. Instead,
they should have examined the ethical design of the
firm as a particular social institution (i.e. at the meso
level, see also Hendry, 2001 on this point). This
design must necessarily draw upon the economic and
legal models of the firm. The theory of the consti-
tutional contract of the firm offers solutions to these
problems. It is better than the alternatives – for
example Donaldson and Dunfee (1995) – because it
explains how a firm may be created by agreement
among the stakeholders, simultaneously considering
efficiency and fairness and drawing on a formal
model of rational bargaining that enables univocal
solutions to be reached. Accordingly, the firm is an
institution that may come into being in relative iso-
lation from other institutions, provided that the social
contract protects stakeholders in the broad sense
against external effects. It thus makes it possible to
propose an institutional arrangement, which entails a
substantial reform of the governance structure of the
firm in respect to conventional models.
From an economic point of view, the institutional
arrangement selected by the constitutional contract
of the firm serves the purpose of achieving greater
social efficiency. The investment decisions of each
agent, in fact, will be made with a view to com-
pensation and redress, to which incentives will adjust
as a consequence. That is, the owner will not over-
invest in order to appropriate extra-rent, while the
parties under his authority will not under-invest due
to the risk of being expropriated. From the legal
point of view, it furnishes a definition of the multiple
fiduciary duties of the board of directors (and a fortiori
of the owners) of the firm towards the stakeholders,
so that conflicting claims are not only explicitly
considered but also balanced against each other in
accordance with a hypothetical principle of agree-
ment that the parties would have accepted ex ante
when the firm was founded if all the information
available now had been considered at that time.
From the ethical point of view, because the solution
proposed results from a process of hypothetical
bargaining, it is neutral. It does not reflect any
arbitrariness in the bargaining status quo, and it also
fulfils two intuitive principles of distributive justice.
For reasons of realism, it is chosen from among the
institutionally feasible arrangements. That is to say, this
is not a Utopian theory, but rather a theory con-
strained by the need to give a viable design to the
economic institutions (and which for example
envisages exclusive property rights in the form that
we have seen). The structure of rights and duties is
deduced and justified endogenously with the simple
idea of a rational agreement; it is not imposed on the
basis of a mere intuition of what society as a whole
would require of the firm. It does not suffer from the
normative indeterminacy of other normative stake-
holder theories.
Appendix 1
I have proposed in previous works (see Sacconi,
1991) a social contract view of the firm’s ownership
and managerial ethics based on a re-examination of
the theory of firm, as well as the notion of extended
fiduciary duties (see also Sacconi, 1999, 2000). The
cooperative-game-theory of the firm put forward by
Mashairo Aoki (1984) can be taken as the path
breaking work in this theorizing on the firm. When
intervening in a discussion about the stakeholder
approach to company law (see also Chapman, 1993;
Daniels, 1993; Machey and Miller, 1993; Romano,
1993), Oliver Hart himself has recognised that the
risk that non-controlling stakeholders may be sub-
jected to contracting costs by those who own the
firm would justify the extension by some corporate
statutes of fiduciary duties also to the stakeholders at
risk (Hart, 1993).Thereafter, convergence to a sim-
ilar model arises from the merger of the incomplete
contract model and Alchian and Demestz’s team
production theory of the firm. Hence the firm can
be seen as a ‘nexus’ of specific investments regulated
by incomplete contracts and a governance structure,
rather than as a nexus of complete contracts, (Rajan
and Zingales, 2000; Zingales, 1998). Based on a
similar view, which combines different theories of
the firm, is the model of multi-stakeholder gover-
nance developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout,
which sees the purpose of corporate governance
structures as being prevention of opportunistic
behaviour among the members of the team that
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make specific investments. When applied to a public
company, this model translates into a board of
directors acting as a mediating hierarchy: an
authority system charged with the task of striking the
appropriate balance in the protection of diverse
interests (see Blair and Stout 1999). The (contro-
versial) legal basis for this form of ‘impartial gover-
nance’ exercised by the board of directors and by
management in the US joint-stock company is the
‘business judgement doctrine’: the manager’s use of a
standard of professional conduct which insulates his/
her choices against claims by shareholders (see Blair
and Stout, 1999; but also see Meese 2002). Similarly,
on a view of the firm as stakeholders’ productive
team (Kaufman, 2002), the board of directors has
been seen as a governance structure representing the
point of view of all those stakeholders who (a)
contribute to creating value; (b) undertake non-
diversifiable risks; (c) possess strategic information
(Kaufman et al., 2003).
Notes
1 In criticizing both Harsanyi and Rawls for their use
of individual decision theory in modelling social justice,
Binmore (1989) argues that an ex ante social contract
under the ‘veil of ignorance’, i.e. reached from an
impersonal and impartial standpoint, should be better
modelled as a (at least two-player) bargaining game over
the intersection of the outcomes spaces of two typical
cooperative Nash bargaining problems- i.e. the symmet-
ric intersecting region resulting form the spaces gener-
ated by the symmetric permutation of the axes
representing the players’ utility assessments with respect
to a primitive outcomes space. A symmetric permuta-
tion is what gives a precise representation to the idea of
impartiality, e.g. seeing the same bargaining problem
under a ‘veil of ignorance’, neutral with respect to indi-
vidual identities. Moreover, the symmetric space of out-
comes – resulting from the intersection of the spaces
generated by the axes’ permutation – can also be inter-
preted in a completely different way from the ex post
perspective concerning the underlying ‘game of life’.
The ex post rationality of the social contract – when
players have returned from the hypothetical position to
the real game of life – is checked through a non-coop-
erative-game analysis of the underlying situation which
seeks to verify whether the social contract (struck under
a ‘veil of ignorance’) may coincide with a Nash equilib-
rium of a non-cooperative game. Binmore models the
underlying ‘game of life’ as an evolutionary repeated
game whose combinations of evolutionary stable strate-
gies coincides with the set of Nash equilibria identifi-
able in the static game representing the situation in
which the social contract has to be put in practice.
These non-cooperative equilibria, with their evolution-
ary explanation, moreover are the same as the set of
outcomes included in the intersection over which ran-
ges the ex ante bargain (see Binmore 2005).
2 A paragon of this indeterminacy is also the
Kantian-like (and hence in some sense also contractari-
an) theory of the firm put forward by Norman Bowie
(1999) in so far as it attempts no more than to define
some generic standards but is unwilling to single out
the governance structure of the firm according to the
Kantian view.
3 For example the EU commission states: ‘‘By stating
their social responsibility and voluntarily taking on
commitments which go beyond common regulatory
and conventional requirements (...), companies endeav-
our (...) to embrace an open governance, reconciling
interests of various stakeholders in an overall approach
of quality and sustainability’’ (Promoting a European
Framework for CSR, European Commission, Green
Paper, p. 4, Brussels, 18.7.2001, emphasis added). See
also OECD, Principles of Corporate Governance, chapter 3,
April, 1999.
4 On fiduciary duties see Flannigan (1989).
5 At first sight, it might be objected that many stake-
holders, in both the ‘strict’ and ‘broad’ senses, do not
have relations with a firm such that they formally dele-
gate authority to those who run it (for example, they do
not vote), with the consequence that the fiduciary duties
as defined earlier do not apply to them. However, in the
model of the social contract as a hypothetical explana-
tion of the origin of the firm – see Section 6 – all the
stakeholders participate in the ‘firm’s second social con-
tract’, with the consequence that their trust constitutes
the authority of the firm’s owner and manager. This also
explains how the authority of the latter may be accepted
by these subjects. Moreover, the hypothetical social con-
tract is typically used to explain how authority – that is,
legitimate power – may come about at both the political
and organizational levels: see Green (1990) and Raz
(1985). For a discussion of managerial authority see
McMahon (1989) and Sacconi (1991).
6 Here I elaborate on an model developed by Horace
Brock (1978, 1979) who suggested the idea of two
bargaining games in sequence, each endowed with its
proper solution concept.
7 Gauthier (1986) discusses the idea of the ‘‘Lockean
proviso’’ as a moralisation for the bargaining status quo;
my point differs slightly in that I introduce within the
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players’ legitimate pre-bargaining claims also the cover-
age of any costs due to efficient specific investments.
8 This danger is also stressed by Tirole (2001), who,
however, recognises the relevance of the stakeholder
approach to corporate governance.
9 See Brock (1979) and Sacconi (1991).
10 See Hobbes, Leviathan, (1651), part 1, chapter 13.
11 Interestingly, also Blair and Stout (1999) adopt the
analogy between the firm and the two social contracts
typical of the social contract tradition.
12 Note that meant here is remuneration in utility and
not necessarily in money. Put in economic parlance, this
remuneration consists of the consumer rent, the producer
rent, the worker rent and so on, accruing to each of
them from the firm’s transactions. This means that some
stakeholders may not want to receive monetary benefits
from the firm, but rather improvements in working con-
ditions or in purchasing power, in the quality of goods
and services, of contractual conditions, etc., to which the
shares of the surplus are in any case devoted.
References
Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz: 1972, Production, Infor-
mation costs and economic Organization, American
Economic Review 62, 777–795.
Aoki, M.: 1984, The Cooperative Game Theory of the Firm,
(Oxford U.P.).
Barry, B.: 1989, Theories of Justice (Harvester-Wheatsheaf,
London)
Binmore, K. and Dasgupta, P., (Eds.): 1987, The Eco-
nomics of Bargaining (Basil Blackwell, Oxford).
Binmore, K.: 1989, Social Contract I: Harsanyi and
Rawls, The Economic Journal 99, 84–102.
Binmore, K.: 1991, Game Theory and The Social
Contract, In R. Selten (Ed.), Game Equilibrium
Models in Economics, Ethics and Social Sciences (Springer,
Berlin).
Binmore, K.: 1994, Playing Fair (MIT Press, Cambridge
Mass).
Binmore, K.: 1997, Just Playing (MIT Press, Cambridge
Mass).
Binmore, K.: 2005, Natural Justice (Oxford U.P., Oxford).
Blair, M.: 2002, Post Enron Reflections on Comparative
Corporate Governance, Georgetown University Law
Centre, Working paper series in Business, Economics
and Regulatory law, No. 316663.
Blair, M. and L. Stout: 1999, ‘A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, Virginia Law Review, 85(2).
Bowie, M.: 1999, Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective
(Blackwell, Oxford)
Brock, H. W.: 1978, A New Theory of Social Justice
Based on the Mathematical Theory of Games, In
Ordeshook (Ed.), Game Theory and Political Science
(New York University Press, New York).
Brock, H. W.: 1979, A Game Theoretical Account of
Social Justice, Theory and Decision 11, 239–265.
Buchanan, J.: 1975, The Limits of Liberty (The University
of Chicago Press).
Chapman, B.: 1993, ‘Trust, Economic Rationality and
Corporate Fiduciary Obligation’, in The Corporate
Stakeholder Conference, University of Toronto Law
Journal, XLII(3), 547–588.
Daniels, R.: 1993, ‘Stakeholder and Takeovers: Can
Contractarianism be Compassionate?’ in ‘‘The Cor-
porate Stakeholder Conference’’, University of Toronto
Law Journal, XLII(3), 315–352.
Dodd, E. N.: 1932, For Whom are Corporate Manager
Trustees?, Harvard Law Review 45, 1145–1163.
Conry, E. J.: 1995, A Critique of Social Contracts for
Business, Business Ethics Quarterly 5(2), 187–212.
Donaldson, T. and T. W. Dunfee: 1994, Toward a
Unified Conceptions of Business Ethics: Integrative
Social Contract Theory, Academy of Management Re-
view 19(2), 252–284.
Donaldson, T. and T. W. Dunfee: 1995, Integrative
Social Contracts Theory, Economics and Philosophy 11,
85–112.
Donaldson, T. and T. W. Dunfee: 1999, Ties that Bind; A
Social Contract Approach to Business Ethics (Harvard
Business School Press).
Donaldson, T. and L. Preston: 1995, The Stakeholder
Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and
Implications, Academy of Management Review 20(1),
65–91.
Englander, E. and A. Kaufman: 2003, Managerial Fidu-
ciary Duty and Social Responsibility: The Changing
Nature of Corporate Governance in the Post-war
America, SMPP working paper 03–04, George
Washington University of Business and Public man-
agement.
European Commission, Green Paper: Promoting a
European Framework for Corporate Social Respon-
sibility, (Bruxelles, 18/07/2001).
Flannigan, R.: 1989, ‘The Fiduciary Obligation’, Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies, 9, 285–294.
Freeman, E.: 1984, Strategic Management, A Stakeholder
Approach (Pitman, Boston).
Freeman, E. and W. M. Evan: 1989, Stakeholder
Management and the Modern Corporation: Kantian
Capitalism, In Beauchamp and Bowie (Eds), Ethical
A Social Contract Account for CSR 279
Theory and Business 3rd edition, (Prentice Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J).
Freeman, R. E. and J. McVea: 2002, A Stakeholder Ap-
proach to Strategic Management, Working paper No. 01–
02, (Darden Graduate School of Business Adminis-
tration).
Freeman, T. and W. M. Evan: 1990, Corporate Gov-
ernance: A Stakeholder Interpretation, The Journal of
Behavioural Economics 19(4), 337–359.
Gauthier, D.: 1986, Morals by Agreement, (Oxford
Clarendon Press).
Green, L.: 1990, The Authority of the State, (Oxford,
Clarendon Press).
Grossman, S. and O. Hart: 1986, The Costs and Benefit
of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration, Journal of Political Economy 94, 691–719.
Hansmann, H.: 1988, Ownership of the Firm, Journal of
Law Economics and Organization 4(2), 263–304.
Hansmann, H.: 1996, The Ownership of Enterprise (Harvard
UP., Cambridge Mass).
Harsanyi, J. C.: 1977, Rational Behaviour and Bargaining
Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge)
Hart, O.: 1993, ‘An Economist’s View of Fiduciary
View’, in The Corporate Stakeholder Conference,
University of Toronto Law Journal, XLII(3), 299–315.
Hart, O.: 1995, Firms, Contract and Financial Structure
(Clarendon Press, Oxford)
Hart, O. and J. Moore: 1990, Property Rights and The
Nature of the Firm, Journal of Political Economy 98,
1119–1158.
Hendry, J.: 2001, Missing the Target: Normative
Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Governance
Debate, Business Ethics Quarterly 11(1), 159–176.
Jensen, M. C.: 2001, ‘Value Maximization, Stakeholder
Theory, and The Corporate Objective Function’,
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 14(3), Fall.
Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky: 1975, Other Solution to
Nash’s Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 43(3), 880–
895.
Kaufman, A.: 2002, Managers’ Double Fiduciary Duty:
To stakeholders and to Freedom, Business Ethics
Quarterly 12(2), 189–213.
Kaufman, A., E. Englander and C. H.Wood: 2003, A
Team Production Model of Corporate Governance revisited,
SMPP working paper 03–03, (George Washington
University of Business and Public Management).
McMahon, C.: 1989, ‘Managerial Authority’, Ethics,
October.
Nagel, T.: 1986, A View Form Nowhere (Oxford Uni-
versity press, Oxford)
Nash, J.: 1950, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica
18, 155–162.
OECD: 1999, Principles of Corporate Governance, April.
Phillips, R., E. Freeman and A. C. Wicks: 2003, What
Stakeholder Theory is Not, Business Ethics quarterly
13(4), 479–502.
Raiffa, H.: 1953, ‘Arbitration Schemes for Generalized
Two Person Games’, in Kuhn, Tucker (eds.) Contribution
to the Theory of Games, (Princeton U.P.), pp. 361–387.
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales: 2000, The Governance of the
New Enterprise, In Xavier Vives (Ed.), Corporate
Governance, Theoretical and Empirical Perspective (Cam-
bridge UP, Cambridge).
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales: 1998, Power in a Theory of the
Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics CXIII, 387–432.
Rawls, J.: 1971, A Theory of Justice (Oxford UP., Oxford).
Raz, J.: 1985, ‘Authority and Justification’, Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 3.
Romano, R. A.: 1993, What is the Value of Other
Constituency Statutes to Stakeholders?, in ‘The Cor-
porate Stakeholder Conference’, University of Toronto
Law Journal, XLII(3), 533–544.
Rubinstein, A.: 1987, Bargaining Model with Incom-
plete Information about Time Preference, In B. K.
eP. Dasgupta (Ed.), The Economics of Bargaining (Basil
Blackwell, Oxford).
Sacconi, L.: 1991, Etica degli affari, individui, imprese e
mercati nella prospettiva dell’etica razionale, Milano, Il
Saggiatore. 1995.
Sacconi, L.: 1999, Codes of Ethics as Contractarian
Constraint on Abuse of Authority: A Perspective from
the Theory of the Firm, Journal of business ethics 21,
189–202.
Sacconi, L.: 2000, The Social Contract of the Firm Economics,
Ethics and Organisation (Springer Verlag, Berlin).
Sacconi, L.: 2004a, CSR As A Model of Extended Corporate
Governance, An Explanation based on the Economic Theory
of Social Contract, Reputation and Reciprocal Conformism,
Liuc paper No. 142.
Sacconi, L.: 2004b, A Social Contract Account for CSR as an
Extended Model of Corporate Governance (II): Compliance,
Reputation and Reciprocity, Discussion paper No. 11.
(Department of economics, Trento University) forth-
coming in the Journal of Business Ethics.
Sen, A.: 1970, Collective Choices and Social Welfare, (Hol-
den Day, San Francisco), 2nd edition, North Holland,
1979.
Shapley, L. S.: 1953, ‘A Value for N-Person Games’, in
Kuhn and Tucker (eds.), Contributions to the Theory of
Games, (Princeton U.P.) pp. 307–317.
Sternberg, E.: 2001, The Stakeholder Concept: A Mistaken
Doctrine (Centre for Business and Professional Ethics
and Foundation for Business Responsibility).
Tirole, J.: 2001, Corporate Governance, Econometrica
69(1), 1–35.
280 Lorenzo Sacconi
Vanberg, V. J.: 1992, Organizations as Constitutional
Order, Constitutional Political Economy 3(2), 223–255.
Van Oosterhout, J. H., P. M. A. R. Heugens and M.
Kaptein: ‘The Internal Morality of Contracting:
Advancing the Contractualist Endeavour in Business
Ethics’’, (Academy of Management Review, forth-
coming).
Willamson, O.: 1986, The Economic Institutions of Capi-
talism (The Free Press, New York)
Williamson, O.: 1975, Market and Hierarchies (The Free
Press, New York)
Zingales, L.: 1998, ‘Corporate governance’, Palgrave
Dictionary of economics and the Law, (London,
McMillan), pp. 497–503.
Lorenzo Sacconi
Department of Economics
University of Trento
Trento,
Italy
E-mail: lorenzo.sacconi@economia.unitn.it
A Social Contract Account for CSR 281
